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Introduction
For decades the Middle East has been one of the most unstable and unsafe regions
in the world. Trying to resolve the regional conflicts is a prime goal on the agenda of
many governments and international institutions. Nevertheless, most of the peace
initiatives proposed by outside actors so far have failed, as their proposed solutions
to the conflicts often did not really take into account the political realities in the
region, but instead were more oriented towards the interests of the external actors.
This instance is particularly apparent in the case of the current US administration.
After having already failed at attempting to reorganize the political landscape of the
Middle East through power politics, the administration of President George W. Bush
turned to diplomacy in order to achieve its goals in the region. However, when that
change of attitude gradually evolved the credibility of his administration was already
weakened to such an extent that none of the regional players appeared to accept
them as a serious partner in the handling and, ultimately, resolving of the various
conflicts. What is more, its rhetoric notwithstanding, the US also failed to offer a prom-
ising solution to the conflicts. At the same time, neither the so-called Middle-East
Quartet (consisting of the US, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations),
nor the Europeans themselves have been able to step in and fill the growing diplo-
matic vacuum. Instead regional actors have taken on the task of settling the regional
disputes. Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and Qatar, to only name a few.Their approach: refrain-
ing from proposing ready-made solutions, and instead focusing on the negotiation
process, including the stake-holders and taking into account their specific interests,
dealing with a single issue at a time, and not putting pressure on anyone by official-
ly proclaiming a great breakthrough before anything has been officially agreed upon.
What are the prospects of these regional initiatives? Has US engagement in the
region become obsolete? And what implications does this have for the European
Union? What should its role be? These questions shall be addressed in the following
paragraphs.
In order to sort out options for a resolution, an understanding of the conflict’s distinct
layers is indispensable. Therefore we start our analysis with an overview of the diffe-
rent conflicts. In this context we will put a particular focus on the Arab-Israeli con-
frontation and related conflicts. In a second step we will outline the main character-
istics of the different types of mediation and introduce current mediation efforts by
regional actors. Based on this analysis we will discuss the strengths and short-
comings of the various diplomatic initiatives and negotiation efforts that are cur-
rently taking place in the region. In a concluding part we will develop recommenda-
tions for European policy on how to support conflict resolution in the Middle East.
Bauer/Ismar · Regional problems – regional solutions? 
Page 4 C·A·P Policy Analysis · 5 · 2008
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 5 · 2008 Page 5
Developing a
differentiated picture
Focus on the Levant
Refugees, settlements,
and Jerusalem
Palestinian disunity 
Bauer/Ismar · Regional problems - regional solutions? 
1. Conflicts in the Middle East
When dealing with the conflicts in the Middle East, one has to bear in mind that all
the key issues are closely linked to each other: Israel has to find a modus vivendi
with its Palestinian population, which is at odds with itself. Hamas and Fatah are
fighting over the control of the Palestinian territories, leaving little hope for a peace-
agreement with Israel. The conflict between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights
is fueled by Syria’s support for Palestinian Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Lebanon’s instability and the increasing strength of Hezbollah constitute a further
threat to Israel’s security. Above all, political instability in Iraq as well as Iran’s hege-
monic ambitions, which it puts on display not least by the support of Hamas and
Hezbollah and its alliance with Syria, add a broader dimension to the conflict as both
factors increase tensions between Sunnis and Shiites within the Muslim communi-
ty. As Ghassan Khatib observes,“this interrelation is growing to an extent that it is
becoming nearly impossible to understand one conflict in isolation.”1
Nonetheless, each conflict displays its own characteristics, and hence a differentiated
picture needs to be drawn. The following paragraphs are to provide an introduction
to the inner-Palestinian altercation, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the inner-Lebanese
power struggle, and the regional role of Syria. This focus of interest is by no means
meant to negate the importance of the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program or
the unstable situation in Iraq. Instead, we focus on the Levant for two reasons: First,
these conflicts impact each other very immediately, not least through the geographic
proximity. This is not to say that the situation in Iraq has no effect on the Arab-Israeli
conflict, however these repercussions are not as direct as in the case of the conflicts
we chose. Moreover, even though the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program is
certainly a central aspect of Middle Eastern politics we do not include it in our anal-
ysis here.2 Instead we conceptualize Iran as an external actor in the conflicts we anal-
yze. Second, as we scrutinize the role of regional mediation efforts we see that
regional actors play a particularly prominent role in the conflicts of the Levant, even
though regional mediation is desirable and on the rise with regards to Iraq and Iran
as well.
1.1. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
The core problem of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the fact that two people
claim control over the same piece of land, is yet to be resolved. Indeed the Palestinian
problem has an impact on the Middle East as a whole. The key issues which impede
a resolution of the conflict are the disputed territories and a lacking agreement on
the borders of a future Palestinian state, the unresolved problem of the Palestinian
refugees’ right to return, the status of Jerusalem, the ever expanding Israeli settle-
ments in the West Bank, and the problem of Palestinian terrorism. These issues have
been addressed in several initiatives and peace agreements, but both parties still
hesitate to comply with their obligations due to a mutual lack of trust.
When dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian relations one has to differentiate between
the two parties of Hamas and Fatah (See also: 1.2. The conflict between Hamas and
Fatah). Since the landslide victory of Hamas in the 2006 national elections, long-
established conflicts between the two major actors in Palestinian politics escalated
over the struggle for political control over the Palestinian territory. Rivalries between
the two parties have existed ever since the foundation of the Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas) during the first Intifada due to the rivaling claims for Palestinian
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leadership and the differing ideological backgrounds of the two parties: whereas
Fatah, the political branch of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) with a
rather nationalist agenda, is considered to be the more “moderate”of the two, Hamas,
which shares it’s roots with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, is a radical Islamic
movement that refuses to play a cooperative role in the peace process.
Israel considers Hamas a terrorist organization, with many of their leading politi-
cians being regarded as public enemies of the state of Israel. Although Hamas has
ultimately adjusted its program and respects the ceasefire that has been agreed upon
in June of 2008, it still refuses to officially recognize Israel, to disarm, and to abdicate
terrorism. On the other hand, the disastrous living conditions in Gaza, originating
from the international isolation of Hamas, and the vast preconditions Israel
demands before starting to hold negotiations, leave the Hamas-led government lit-
tle room for action. A lack of trust on both sides and the serious asymmetry of power
complicate a rapprochement between Israel and Hamas which has brought the
political process to a deadlock.
On behalf of the Fatah, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas is ready to negotiate
with Israel and is ready to make important concessions. President Abbas’ role in the
so-called Annapolis process, which was initiated under US guidance in November of
2007 at the Annapolis peace conference, provides the most recent example for that.
Moreover, Fatah can be considered the more cooperative and more reliable partner
for sorting out Israeli-Palestinian problems. President Abbas so far has supported all
international initiatives and has met with Israeli President Shimon Peres and Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert several times. Admittedly, President Abbas has lost
power in the inner-Palestinian struggle, not only because of the increasing competi-
tion from Hamas but also due to Fatah’s severe corruption and poor governance per-
formance, and will hardly be capable to implement any peace-accord against the will
of Hamas. In other words, Israel never faced a partner more willing and at the same
time less capable to negotiate.
1.2. The conflict between Hamas and Fatah: The struggle for Palestine
As displayed above, the relations between the two major Palestinian parties have
deteriorated since 2006: That year’s elections, intended to officially strengthen
President Abbas, put the public support for the resistance of Hamas as well as the
accumulated discontent with Fatah’s political performance and its tendency to cor-
ruption on display. Hamas called for the formation of a national unity government,
including all parties in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), but all of its offers
for cooperation have been turned down – demonstrably also due to negative reac-
tions from abroad. Fatah never recognized the legitimacy of the Hamas-led govern-
ment and opposed the idea of political collaboration, while President Abbas main-
tained control of the whole security apparatus. Notwithstanding Saudi mediation in
Mecca in 2007, which resulted in a fragile ceasefire and the formation of a unity
government, violent fighting between Hamas and Fatah increased, resulting in a civil
war-like situation and in the separation of Palestinian territory: Hamas seized con-
trol of Gaza, whereas the West Bank remains a Fatah stronghold.
However, inner-Palestinian conflict has also been fueled by outside actors as the
internal struggle limits Palestinian power in negotiations: During the first Intifada
(1987-1993), Israel has deliberately closed their eyes to the activities of Hamas while
prosecuting members of Fatah. The inner-Palestinian divide was serving Israel’s stra-
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tegy to weaken the PLO, which they considered to be the greater threat at that time.3
After Hamas presented itself as a radical movement and opposed the peace-process
“sympathies”have shifted: Fatah received extensive support from the US before the
elections and still does today, including monetary funding, arms, and military train-
ing.4 Iran on the other hand provides Hamas with material and ideological support.
This increasing role of Shiite Iran causes additional concern among the Arab coun-
tries ruled by Sunni Muslims.
What further complicates the situation is the heterogeneity within both parties. Both
comprise a political and a military wing which both follow different strategies. In the
case of Hamas this discrepancy is most obvious as its politic bureau is currently lo-
cated in Sudan, outside Palestinian territory.5 Also, both parties have to deal with the
struggle between moderate and more radical forces within, which further compli-
cates decision-making processes.
Needless to say, inner-Palestinian reconciliation is the key to a successful peace pro-
cess, as negotiations with Israel can only lead to a sustainable pacification of the
region when they are accepted in both Gaza and the West Bank.
1.3. The conflict over Lebanon
Even before Hezbollah’s war against Israel in the summer of 2006 Lebanon was a
fragile state. Since then, political developments have heightened the traditional eth-
nic and religious tensions. Moreover, external actors have pursued their specific
agendas, by which they contributed to the country’s political disarray.6 In May 2008,
inner-Lebanese power struggle between the Sunni government and Hezbollah
opposition escalated into an armed conflict that pushed the country on the verge of
a civil war.
For various reasons Lebanon represents one of the key locations where Iran has an
interest to interfere: the fragile political system which traditionally perpetuated
Christian and Sunni supremacy over the Shiites provides a fertile soil for Iranian
engagement and the evolution of a radical Shiite movement, such as Hezbollah.
Moreover, the ideological influence on Hezbollah provides Iran with a direct access
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Although Syria does not share Iran’s ideological motives it has strong historic ties to
the Shiite republic. Via Syria, Iran can provide Hezbollah with material support.
However, supporting Hezbollah is also a tactical move for Syria itself: first, by means
of Hezbollah, which has evolved from being a militant resistance movement to being
a political factor in Lebanon, Syria can once again access the political agenda of its
neighbor and regains its influence over Lebanon’s security policy agenda where
Syria had lost leverage after the forced withdrawal of their military troops in 2005. In
addition to that, the Syrian political establishment has massive economic interests in
Lebanon. Further, Syria is trying to resume its position as a key political actor in the
region to overcome political isolation: its influence on Lebanon and Hezbollah might
be seen as a bargaining chip for President Bashar al-Assad to help him achieve that
goal.
The presence of Hezbollah on Israel’s northbound frontier in southern Lebanon
represents a constant threat to the security of the state of Israel; the outcome of the
war of 2006 has broken the nimbus of the invincibility of the Israel Defense Forces
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(IDF). Even more problematic for Jerusalem, this has strengthened Hezbollah’s posi-
tion within Lebanon and made Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah one of the most
popular figures for the so-called Arab Street. Israel thus tries to strengthen moderate
forces in Lebanon in order to weaken the Shiite movement and thus pacify and
secure its northern border.
The tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, which gravely affect national decision-
making processes, further complicate the situation: The competing interests of both
external and internal players have led the country to a political deadlock, leaving it
on the brink of civil war and without an effective government for more than six
months. Only with the help of external actors, namely Qatar and Turkey, resulting in
the Doha agreement of 2008, could the situation be de-escalated and the political
stalemate be overcome. However, political tensions remain, leaving Lebanon’s future
in the air.
Stabilizing Lebanon is key, as it can be regarded as an epicenter of the Middle-East
Conflict in which all the important actors try to claim their interests. Such endeavor
would require an effective tactic of dealing with Hezbollah. Moreover, since Syria
facilitates Hezbollah’s access to arms and money, a sustainable solution in southern
Lebanon would need Damascus’ support.7
1.4. The conflict between Israel and Syria
Syria’s role in the region is as crucial as it is ambiguous. The meaning behind Henry
Kissinger’s famous quote that without Syria there would be no peace in the Middle
East becomes obvious when looking at Damascus’potential to act as spoiler. Without
Syrian consent the political arrangements in Lebanon will not be sustainable:
Damascus can obstruct the stabilization of Iraq, it is a strategic ally of Iran, and it has
the means to support Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and radicals in Hamas. It
thus possesses the ability to strengthen the radical forces in the region.8 Syria does
not recognize the state of Israel and since the Six-Day War of 1967 there has only
been a ceasefire agreement between the two states. Against this background it
should be obvious that a rapprochement of Israel and Syria would not only end a
longstanding conflict that has repeatedly erupted in violence, but also substantially
alter the political landscape of the region.9
For both partners, there is much to gain from an agreement. It is not hard to guess
what Syria demands from Israel: Damascus wants to regain the Golan Heights,
which have been conquered and later annexed by Israel in 1967. Further, peace with
Israel would possibly end the economic and political isolation of the regime, espe-
cially on behalf of the US, which is of great importance to Assad, promising econo-
mic growth, increasing diplomatic freedom, and regime stability. These are strong
points of interest for Syria in terms of realpolitik, and it might well be possible that
Damascus would be willing to give up its support of Hamas and Hezbollah, and even
loosen its ties with Tehran in exchange, as engagement in Lebanon and the alliance
with Iran are arguably not driven by ideological or sectarian interests but rather serve
as a means to strengthen Syrian bargaining power.10
An agreement with Syria would mean strong strategic gains for Israel vis-à-vis its
three strongest antagonists. If Syria ceases to function as a channel for foreign aid to
Hamas and Hezbollah and stops its own support for these groups, a pacification of
the border in Israel’s northern region as well as Gaza could be possible. In addition,
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Iran, seen by many in Israel as an existential threat, would lose its most important
strategic ally in the region.
Much is to gain, but peace won’t come easy. Mistrust between Israel and Syria runs
deep: there is a suspicion in Israel that Syria does not want peace; all it wants is to
end its isolation, and peace is merely a strategy to reach that goal.11 Many Israelis
don’t trust the Baath-regime and fear that President Assad might not comply with
his obligations deriving from an agreement. Moreover, the majority of Israelis is very
skeptical about giving up the Golan Heights, even though public opposition is
decreasing rapidly in view of the recent negotiations.12 This public sentiment meets
with the strategic concerns that already exist: giving up the Golan Heights would
mean that a former enemy would gain control of the majority of Israel’s water
resources and overlook northern Israel from the hilltops.
Consequently, any initiative involving a withdrawal from the Golan Heights would
be hard to communicate to the Israeli public, and that raises Syrian concerns about
the enforcement and popular support in a referendum on a possible peace agree-
ment between the two states.
2. Regional mediation efforts
Traditionally, the Levant has always been an area that aroused the interest of exter-
nal players, during the age of colonialism as well as during the Cold War, and the
conflicts that have to be dealt with today partly derive from foreign interference. For
the last decades the Middle East has again been an arena for international interven-
tion. The world witnessed a wide range of approaches brought forward by different
players trying to resolve the conglomerate of conflicts, unfortunately most of them
with only limited success. The Middle-East Conflict traditionally holds a high place
on the foreign policy agenda in the US particularly. Past US administrations had
launched several initiatives aiming for the “grand bargain”, such as the Madrid
Conference in 1991 and Camp David II in 2000. However, under the Bush-adminis-
tration the focus of the US engagement in the region has shifted to Iraq and
Afghanistan, which are of higher importance especially in domestic politics. When it
came to Israel and Palestine, mediation efforts of the current US administration 
failed, largely due to its unconditional support for Israel that brought about a severe
loss of credibility and fueled an increasing tendency of anti-Americanism. Thus, the
most recent attempt to reach a “grand bargain” at least for the Palestine conflict,
which was initiated in Annapolis in November of 2007 and is intended to result in
an independent Palestinian state before George W. Bush leaves office in January
2009, is considered very unlikely to succeed.13 Moreover, given Mr. Bush’s status as
a lame duck president, the current US administration’s influence in the region is 
further decreasing.
The European Union (EU) in turn seems like a promising actor on the scene and
would have the resources, credibility, and ambition to fill the United States’ shoes.14
However, the EU has not yet decided on which role to play, falling short of its pos-
sibilities. The revival of the Middle East Quartet under the German presidency of the
European Council seemed like a promising sign, but admittedly not much has hap-
pened since. The Quartet could be a forum in which the EU could propose politics
without running the danger of challenging the US administration15, but has not yet
made use of this opportunity.
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Against this background, one might have expected diplomacy in the Middle East to
come to a standstill altogether. However, the contrary was the case: over the course
of the last year, the Middle East has seen a remarkable amount of diplomatic initia-
tives that were developed within the region itself. Regional actors make use of their
increased maneuvering space brought about by the decreased influence of external
actors. In turn, this development has further sidelined America’s role in Middle East
diplomacy. As Rami Khouri rightly notes, “important regional issues seem to be
moving into the hands of local players and mediators. […] This is good news because
it signals both willingness and a capacity by regional actors to act as diplomatic
mediators, rather than constantly looking to foreign powers to nudge the warring
parties towards negotiated accords.”16 Egypt is trying to arrange a ceasefire between
Hamas and Israel, Turkey is the channel for talks between Syria and Israel; Saudi
Arabia plays an ever-increasing role in regional diplomacy. Not to forget the emir of
Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, under whose auspices the Doha
Agreement for Lebanon took shape, and Yemen, which negotiated the Sanaa-
Declaration constituting another attempt to reconcile Hamas and Fatah.
2.1. Mediation in international conflicts
“International mediation has become almost as common as conflict itself.”17
Throughout history, conflicts in international relations have repeatedly been the sub-
ject of mediation, for it represents an important alternative to resolving differences
violently. Mediation in international relations is to be understood as a specific form
of conflict management in which the affected parties seek the assistance of, or
embrace an offer for help from a third party, which tries to facilitate a settlement of
the dispute.18 Thus, mediation turns an originally bilateral dispute into “triadic inter-
action”19, and by that changes the structural character of the conflict.
Mediation can be carried out either through private individuals, government offi-
cials, non-governmental organizations (NGO), regional and international organiza-
tions, or by states. Each player possesses a specific set of interests and resources,
applicable to variable forms of conflict. The mediator can modify the conflict by
influencing the conflicting parties, the nature of how the conflict is fought, or the
context in which the conflict takes place.
Even though mediation is ideally intended to be a process in which the participants
take part voluntarily, mediators naturally also possess power resources, which they
employ in the mediation efforts.“Mediators’ resources constitute the basis required
for exercising leverage, or better still, any form of influence.”20 Consequently,
“power”, in this context, shall be understood as all characteristics of a mediator that
can be employed to exert influence on the conflict, the conflicting parties, or the
environment in which they are operating. In this sense, it is possible to differentiate
between various sources of power:21
– Reward Power means that the mediator possesses resources which are valued by
the parties and can be offered as an incentive to come to a negotiated solution.
On the other hand, the mediator possesses Coercive Power if he or she is in the
position to threaten withdrawal of material or political support, or even apply
sanctions in case the conflict parties reject negotiations. These instruments are
the well known “sticks and carrots”that are employed by great powers or strong
international organizations in their mediation efforts.
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– The mediator might exercise Expert Power if he or she actually possesses or can
create the impression of being in the possession of knowledge relevant for the
resolution of the conflict. This kind of resource is usually the strength of indivi-
duals, such as professional mediators, diplomats, or former politicians.
– Also dependent on the perception of the conflict parties is the legitimacy on which
the mediator bases his or her involvement in the conflict. Almost any mediator will
possess some kind of Legitimate Power, if only by the fact of trying to resolve a con-
flict. However, the higher the degree of legitimacy the conflict parties ascribe to
the mediator the more difficult it will be for them to reject the suggestions made
by the third party. Usually international or regional organizations, NGOs, or public
figures like former politicians possess a high degree of Legitimate Power, but also
small states with few or no geostrategic interests might be able to exercise what
Randa Slim calls “the legitimate power of powerlessness”.22
– If there is a special relationship between the mediator and the conflict parties that
is valued by the disputants, the mediator can exercise Referent Power. This rela-
tionship might derive from religion, ethnicity or history, and it implies that there
is already some trust between the mediator and the parties of the conflict.
Moreover, the conflict parties believe that the mediator understands their moti-
ves and truly attempts to reconcile their divergent interests. Obviously, this kind
of power is a characteristic of mediators coming from the same region as the
antagonists, hence it is a particularly important feature for the analysis at hand.
– Additional characteristics any mediator has to possess are relentlessness and
patience.23 Mediation processes are seldom finished within a time of weeks or a
few months only but might last years. In particular for great powers this can pre-
sent a problem as they might fear to lose reputation if they are engaged in pro-
longed negotiation efforts without being able to bring about a positive conclusion.
In accordance with their resources, the parties’ needs, interests and capabilities, and
the nature of the conflict, the mediator might choose between three categories of
mediation strategies, which differ in terms of the intensity with which the mediator
infers in the conflict:24
– In the case of Communication-facilitating Strategies, the main aim is to re-establish
communication between the parties. The mediator confines himself to the role of
communication channel. On this basis one hopes that the disputants can ex-
change views on the nature of their conflict, develop an understanding of motives
of the respective opponent, and identify possible points of departure for nego-
tiations. Specific for this kind of strategy is that the mediator refrains from formu-
lating alternatives on how to settle the dispute.
– By employing strategies that focus on shaping the negotiation process
(Formulation Strategies), the mediator attempts to control the nature, the environ-
ment, the timing and the political contents of the communication between the
parties. This might include informal meetings between the parties, individual
meetings of the mediator with the parties, joint sessions, shuttle-diplomacy,
workshops (often in combination), setting up an agenda, addressing simple
issues first, arranging package deals, etc. Thus, the mediator organizes the format
as well as the contents of the communication.
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– Manipulative Strategies are the most intense kind of interference: Here the medi-
ator exercises direct influence over the conflict and the opponents. The mediator
can introduce proposals for the resolution of the conflict that constitutes a com-
promise of the opponents’ positions (arbitration). Also, the mediator might exer-
cise pressure or provide incentives in order for the parties to come to an agree-
ment (power mediation). In addition to that, the mediator might be able to milita-
rily guarantee the agreement reached by the antagonists and economically and
politically support its implementation (peace-keeping/peace-building). Especially
when there is a great imbalance of power, the conflicting parties are likely to be
unable to agree on viable negotiated arrangements, and thus a powerful media-
tor can make a great difference as to bringing about a just and mutually accepted
agreement.25
The mediator’s resources and the mediation strategies have been discussed as vari-
ables determining the chances to succeed with mediation efforts. Another central
aspect is the question whether the conflict is “ripe for resolution”.26 That means that
the conflicting parties must perceive themselves as locked in a hurting stalemate and
come to realize that their current strategy of confrontation has failed. Under this
condition there is a chance that the opponents take on a conciliatory mentality with
a will to compromise. However, even if this is the case there still needs to be a via-
ble alternative available that allows the parties to reach a negotiated compromise. It
is the task of the mediator to help the parties find this alternative. In particular medi-
ators endowed with substantial economic or military capabilities might try to use this
leverage to engage in power mediation in order to change the variables of the con-
flict and thus proactively make the conflict ripe for negotiations. However, it is ques-
tionable how sustainable such conflict resolution efforts are, as they would require a
long-term engagement on behalf of the mediator in order to keep the conflict par-
ties at the negotiating table and enforce the agreements that are reached.
2.2. Mediators in the Middle East
As highlighted above, the Middle East has experienced and is experiencing a wide
range of mediation efforts in the past as well as in the present day, which all had
their strengths and shortcomings, leading to different results. In the following para-
graphs, the characteristics of the current initiatives shall be analyzed and assessed.
2.2.1. Egypt
The breach of the Egyptian-Gaza border in January of 2008 has vividly demonstrated
that developments in Gaza will eventually also affect Egyptian politics. The situation
in Gaza impacts Egyptian security in two ways: There is a fear in Cairo that a conso-
lidated Islamist Hamas regime in Gaza could resemble the political system the
Muslim brotherhood intends for Egypt and might create spillover effects into
Egypt.27 Moreover, Egypt feels very uncomfortable with the influence Iran has gained
in Gaza through its support for Hamas.
Egypt wants to exercise a moderating influence on Hamas directly, and at the same
time tries to secure the cooperation between the relevant actors, namely Hamas,
Israel, and the PA.Throughout the year 2008 Egypt has been trying to engage Hamas
in the peace process, facilitating meetings with both Fatah and Israel. In June of 2008,
thanks to Egyptian mediation Israel and Hamas managed to agree on a ceasefire that
has turned out to be more stable than expected.
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Egyptian mediation is strongly facilitated by the country’s cultural and political
standing and its historical role as a leader of the Arab world. Using the terminology
introduced above, it possesses referent and legitimate power. Egypt unquestionably
has a strong interest in improving the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian terri-
tory not only because of the geographic proximity. Moreover, it can count on good
relations with the different Palestinian groups because of historical ties and a shared
cultural background, and can thus act as a mediator between them. Due to the tradi-
tional importance of Egypt in Arab politics, Egypt always used to be an important
facilitator for peace in the Arab world. Furthermore, as Egypt is one of the few Arab
states that have officially recognized Israel, it does enjoy Israeli confidence and is
considered a reliable and trusted partner.
A central point in Egyptian efforts was to re-establish and facilitate communication
between the conflict parties. In order to do so it used its good relations to the dispu-
tants and convinced them to overcome their reservations about each other. This could
be observed during Egyptian efforts to reconcile Israel and Fatah with Hamas: both
Israel and Fatah were persuaded that it be in their own interest to talk to Hamas, which
was the precondition to make negotiations possible. Given its well-established politi-
cal relations in the region, Egypt could provide informal communication links between
the conflicting parties. Especially in the case of Israel and Hamas Egypt had to proceed
with a high degree of diplomatic sensitivity. Moreover, Cairo did not offer a complete
solution to the conflicts but was solely trying to lower tensions between the antago-
nists and to encourage them to move towards direct interaction. Hence, its main goal
was to overcome the obstacles that impede the diplomatic process. Egypt indeed was
successful in bringing the parties together, which was a great achievement. In the case
of Israel and Hamas it even succeeded in brokering a ceasefire. However, talks be-
tween Hamas and Fatah have shown no significant results, because both parties still
seem to consider their position strong enough to achieve their goals unilaterally and
Egypt was not in the position or was unwilling to change that calculation.
2.2.2. Saudi Arabia
Although Saudi Arabia has always been an important player in shaping regional poli-
tics, the country has turned into one of the most active and powerful players in the
Arab world and beyond since King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 2005.“Since
then, Saudi Arabia has been more forthcoming and forceful in its views on Gulf and
Middle East crises than before. Riyadh realized that the fault lines in the region –
Palestinian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Lebanese, carry with them the potential to destabilize
the kingdom and the entire Arab world.”28 Thus, the Sunni kingdom is trying to bro-
ker peace in the region, which promises improved Arab cooperation as well as eco-
nomic benefits. Saudi Arabia sees itself threatened by Iranian hegemonic ambitions
and the political empowerment of long-oppressed Shiite communities across the
region, which could agitate religious distribution of power within the country and tip
the balance of power in the region in Iran’s direction. Engaging Hamas in the peace
process would limit Tehran’s influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In 2002, the Saudi kingdom had proposed the Arab Peace Initiative which offered
Israel an exchange of land for peace, meaning that the Arab League would fully
recognize the state of Israel if Israel in turn would withdraw from all the occupied
territories and grant the Palestinian refugees the right to return. Riyadh successfully
encouraged the Arab League to join this effort which still represents an important
framework for negotiations.29
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In 2007, King Abdullah hosted negotiations between Hamas and Fatah in Mecca,
which resulted in the formation of the National Unity Government. Although this
breakthrough was short-lived and violence between the two parties recrudesced
90 days later, it did show that King Abdullah is ready to take on regional leadership.
Being the home of the Two Holy Mosques, Mecca and Medina, the kingdom enjoys
a prominent position in the Islamic world. Moreover, being an important member of
both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council it can count on the backing
of its Arab neighbors – and also not insignificantly on its vast oil reserves. In addi-
tion to that, Saudi Arabia traditionally enjoys good relations with the US and also
high credibility in Israel. Further, all three states have a common foe in Tehran, which
augments confidence in each other. These features equip the kingdom with exten-
sive leverage in terms of “sticks and carrots” (reward and coercive power), but also
legitimate and referent power.
Given Saudi Arabia’s economic power and strategic ties, King Abdullah can offer the
conflicting parties strong economic and diplomatic incentives to back the negotia-
tion process. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is also in a position in which it can
castigate non-cooperation from its partners by threatening to withdraw its support.
The fact that the Saudi kingdom can also draw on its good relations with the US fur-
ther enhances this capability. Hence Saudi Arabia is in a position to employ more
proactive mediation strategies that not only shape the negotiation process but also,
and more important, the expectations of the parties of the conflict.
Yet Saudi Arabia is also exercising diplomatic leadership in addressing several of the
regional hotspots beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict.30 The invitation of Taliban repre-
sentatives to Mecca to negotiate with Afghan government officials in October of
2008 was especially noteworthy.31 Moreover, King Abdullah has invited Iranian pre-
sident Ahmadinejad to the pilgrimage to Mecca in 2007.32 This publicly disputed act
has underlined Saudi ambitions to deal with political issues not in an aggressive, but
in a cooperative way.
In addition to these realpolitik issues, King Abdullah has made religious dialogue one
of his political priorities. This includes inner-Islamic relations, in particular between
Shia and Sunni branches of Islam, as well as the inter-religious dialogue. The king-
dom organized high-profile conferences on both aspects. Given his status as
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Mecca and Medina, King Abdullah possesses
the necessary authority to further such attempts for religious reconciliation. These
efforts to foster inner-religious and intra-religious understanding create a more favo-
rable atmosphere to addressing the political conflicts in the region as well.
2.2.3. Turkey
For the first time since the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is once again
playing a key role in shaping the political order of the Mashreq region. Under the
current government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan Turkey has reoriented its
foreign policy to play an increasingly important role in Middle Eastern politics in
general and conflict resolution in particular.33 Engagement with its eastern and
southern neighbors is to be seen as a product of Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign
policy and emancipation from the US, which still opposes any contact with the re-
gime in Damascus. Moreover, it is a demonstration of increasing international in-
fluence. From the perspective of its Muslim neighbors, the fact that an openly Islamic
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party as the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partiesi, AKP) could
gain governmental responsibility without being removed from power increased the
credibility of Turkey. The success of the AKP helped to eliminate the perception of
Turkey as being a country where a “small secular elite [ruled over the] populous but
powerless Islamic mass”34 and made it a role model for other Muslim countries.
For the time being the most important results of this new orientation of Turkish
foreign policy are the talks between Syria and Israel mediated by Ankara. Recon-
ciliation between these two antagonists would fundamentally alter the political
landscape of the Middle East, and the importance of the Turkish initiative cannot be
overestimated. Admittedly, the negotiations have not moved to the next stage,
meaning from “Shuttle-diplomacy” to direct talks between the two delegations.
Moreover, Israel has postponed the fifth round of talks due to “technical and legal
constraints”35. The resignation of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in September of 2008
and the resulting uncertainty regarding Israeli politics has not made things easier. It
remains to be seen whether it will be possible to continue the negotiations despite
the beginning of the election campaign in Israel.36 But in spite of the challenges that
negotiations between Israel and Syria will bear, the Turkish initiative constitutes a
significant step that provides new perspectives in the peace process.
Turkey entered new diplomatic territory with this initiative and was given credit not
only by the two conflicting parties, but also by the international community, espe-
cially the EU. The fact that Turkish diplomacy addresses its eastern and southern
neighbors is not to be mistaken as a turning away from Europe, quite the contrary.37
The Turks feel predestined to act as a link between Europe and the Middle East, not
only because of geographic reasons: as a secular Muslim state it represents a cultural
link between the two regions.
Moreover, after Barack Obama had won the US Presidential election, Ankara public-
ly offered to mediate between the next US administration and Iran.38 This under-
scores that Turkey has evolved into a crucial political actor in the region and is wil-
ling to develop this role further.
As a secular, western oriented state it is a trusted partner for Israel – as a Muslim
state it enjoys the trust of its Arab neighbors. Consequently, Turkey holds a high
potential of referent power, which increases the acceptance of its political role on
both sides. The fact that Turkey has strong ties to the affected parties but has never-
theless never interfered in the conflict and is not directly affected by it grants Turkey’s
action strong legitimacy, which adds to its authority. Moreover, because of its politi-
cal flexibility Turkish foreign policy succeeded in keeping or establishing communi-
cation channels to all the important actors in the region. This is another important
asset for its potential as mediator.
The fact that Turkey will serve as a non-permanent member of the UN-Security
Council for a two-year term, starting on January 1, 2008 will certainly contribute to
Ankara’s political assertiveness and increase its regional influence. In addition to
that, Turkey is also a military power in the region and hence in a position to contrib-
ute to peacekeeping efforts as in the case of the UN-Force (Unifil) that is securing
the border between Israel and Lebanon and monitoring the ceasefire that ended the
war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.
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2.2.4. Yemen
As the Mecca Agreement has demonstrated, Hamas and Fatah are well aware of the
fact that they ultimately have to find a modus vivendi. After hostilities between the
Palestinian factions increased following the collapse of the National Unity Govern-
ment,Yemen has yet again advocated a peaceful solution to the conflict in 2008 and
thus invited both Hamas and Fatah to Sana’a.39 The joint declaration, which origi-
nated from the negotiations, states the will of both parties to return to the status quo
ante before the outbreak of fighting. Both parties agreed in principal but in fact give
very little importance to it, since heavy fighting between Hamas forces and a
Palestinian clan that supported Fatah broke out in Gaza only a few weeks after the
Yemenit negotiation effort.40
Yemen has a strong interest in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to stabilize
the region. However, it has no strategic interests in Palestine. The country is struggling
with internal Islamist tendencies and structural instability. Furthermore, it is located
at a pivotal point between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq – an ideal
“breeding ground”for terrorists.41 As the attack on the US embassy in September of
2008 has demonstrated,Yemen, as a supporter of Bush’s War on Terror, is also grave-
ly affected by the conflict in the region and tries to work towards stability for its own
sake as well. The fact that Yemen itself is affected by the hostilities in the region in-
creases its credibility as a mediator who has genuine interest in a sustainable reso-
lution of the conflict. Moreover, the Yemenites have a profound knowledge of the
conflict and are expected to take into account its political, cultural, and historical
dimensions. In addition, Yemen’s status as a small and powerless state increases its
legitimacy, as there is no reason to suspect that the country could pursue any hidden
agenda with its efforts.
2.2.5. Qatar
Stability is also in the interest of the Emir of Qatar, who has lately proven to be an
active supporter of the peace process in the Middle East. The royal leadership has
learned to “balance contradictory political interests as a means of national preserva-
tion”42. Rich in resources43 but poor in military capacity, the emirate is successfully
using diplomacy to pursue its regional agenda. The Doha-Agreement of May 2008
has been an important step to stabilize Lebanon and to stop further escalation of the
violence between the Sunni government and the Hezbollah opposition. What is
more, the agreement that was reached with the support of Turkey and Saudi Arabia
has also ended the political stalemate that had paralyzed Lebanon for the last six
months. A new distribution of power has been agreed upon, and with Michel
Suleiman a new President was elected.44 Controversial issues, such as strengthening
Hezbollah’s role in the political system and repeated fighting in Tripoli even after the
ceasefire, remain but Doha, as an interim agreement, still facilitates the re-establish-
ment of a political process within Lebanon and thus represents an important bench-
mark in the consolidation process of Lebanese statehood.
The emirate has initiated an extensive mediation and consultation process in order
to achieve a long awaited stabilization of the Lebanese statehood. Qatar can draw on
both US support (as Qatar is home to the biggest US military base in the region) and
its good relations with Tehran, with whom it shares a natural gas field. In addition to
that, the diplomatic experience the emirate gained during its membership in the UN
Security Council in 2006 and 2007 facilitated its political efforts. As a sponsor of the
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al-Jazeera Network based in Doha, it has gained unprecedented prestige in the Arab
world and can thus legitimize its involvement in the peace process. Moreover, the
emirate enjoys economic ties with Israel. Natural riches, such as oil and gas, give the
emirate the resources needed to follow through with its diplomatic activity, which
aims at patronizing both the peace process and the economic boom the country is
experiencing. Hence, Qatar’s diplomatic activity may be seen as successful attempts
to pacify the region, but also as a “survival mechanism in an unforgiving corner of
the world.”45 In addition to its role as political mediator, Qatar has also invested
large sums in the reconstruction of Lebanese towns, providing additional incentives
for the conflicting parties to come to an agreement. Moreover, the good relations
between Syria and Qatar, which also include financial attention on behalf of the
emirate46, and the latter’s will to stabilize Lebanon might also have facilitated the
amelioration of Syrian-Lebanese relations.“Qatar, on the Lebanon issue, is the only
country with good relations on both sides and has the money to back it up.”47
Qatar’s diplomatic ambition is also displayed by its political initiative with regards to
the conflict in the Sudanese province of Darfur.48
2.3. Assessing the regional mediation efforts
Since the actors introduced above all have their individual approaches to set about a
resolution to the different fields of conflict, an ultimate classification of the different
approaches is hardly possible. Moreover, some of the initiatives, such as the shuttle
diplomacy between Syria and Israel, are still in the making and have not yet led to
clear results.
Still, we can observe an important change in diplomatic activity in the region:
Whereas attempts by players like the US, the Middle-East Quartet, and the EU have
so far failed to reach an inclusive agreement, Arab and Turkish diplomats have taken
on the task of pacifying their own neighborhood and re-shaping the political land-
scape of the region. As the US has renounced its role of key “mediator”in the region,
and the EU as well as the Middle-East Quartet seemed unlikely to fill its shoes, the
stage was open for regional players. According to the Spanish foreign minister,
Miguel Moratinos, "One of the most important changes […] in the Middle East is
that the countries in the region itself are taking their own responsibilities".49 And
they are successful at doing so: The unparalleled success of recent Arab and Turkish
mediation, especially vis-à-vis Lebanon, raises the question whether regional medi-
ation is a possible alternate route to take for other conflicts.50 After all, a peace deal
brokered by a nation form the region is more likely to be accepted throughout the
Arab world than any “western” project. Because,“contrary to conventional wisdom,
outsiders have only very limited capacity to bring contending sides in the Middle
East to meaningful negotiations”51, especially if the local players lack political will
themselves. The so-called “Quartet of moderates”52 (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey), as well as the other actors such as Turkey or Yemen possess the diplomatic
relations, the cultural insights, and the different forms of power that are necessary to
advocate peace talks.
Regional mediators are seriously interested in a just and lasting peace, as they would
often be directly affected by failure. This leads to a stronger commitment on behalf
of the mediators, which manifests itself in the willingness to provide their diploma-
tic efforts with financial backing (as seen in the case of Qatar) and to search for
means to overcome traditional obstacles (like the shuttle-diplomacy exercised by
Turkey due to the refusal of Israel and Syria to speak to each other directly).
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Moreover, although tensions between the actors remain, the region’s states have
displayed a more inclusive and thus more pragmatic approach than previous inter-
national initiatives: peace without the inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria is
not likely to last. Hence regional diplomacy concentrates on these “troublespots”,
including the former “obstructors”, to end the stalemate in the peace process without
imposing vast preconditions. For the EU, and even more the US, such a direct diplo-
matic engagement is hard to implement, especially in the case of Hamas and
Hezbollah given the Western stance towards these entities in the past.
All the players introduced above can draw on regional expertise, which distinguishes them
from external actors, namely the US, Europe, and the Quartet. Given their proximity to the
affected region, a common religious ground, and a cultural analogy, they are in a better
position to understand the motives of the parties and the complexities of the conflicts.
Although the commitment highlighted above is of immeasurable importance to the peace
process, there are also potential shortcomings and limits of the regional mediation efforts.
Firstly, the “Arab world”as such does not exist when it comes to the resolution of the
Middle East Conflict. The states are competing for their national interests, catering
to the needs of their allies, and are, most importantly, divided along confessional
lines. Division and contrasting interests of the Arab countries are themselves part of
the conflict; the Palestinian divide is probably the most overt proof to that point.
Secondly, the United States will ultimately remain “indispensable”for conflict reso-
lution in the Middle East for two reasons: In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, the power differences between the actors is far too big to be overcome by Arab-
mediation only. Ultimately, only the US will be in the position to convince Israel to
make the necessary concessions to the Palestinians, as only the US can act as guar-
antor for Israeli security. Similarly, it is very unlikely that Syria or Israel would be wil-
ling to sign up to any peace deal that is not backed by the US, as recognition by
America is a major motive for Syria’s rapprochement with Israel, and for Israel its stra-
tegic alliance with the United States constitutes a guarantee for national security.
Egypt, Turkey, and Yemen have merely focused on bringing the two parties together
and lessening tensions between them, which can be seen as an important step that
can also be historic in some cases, like the conciliation between Syria and Israel. The
countries have acted as a bridge to overcome obstacles that impede negotiations.
However, this approach is highly dependent on the conflicting parties’ will, need,
and ability to compromise. The Sana’a Declaration is a good example of this short-
coming: both parties have accepted the invitation and have issued a joint declaration
– but none of the parties give it much significance and also cannot be forced to do
so. Instead, it seems that both Hamas and Fatah still expect to be able to improve
their respective positions so that they can achieve better results. Hence, the conflict
between them seems not yet ripe for a resolution. The same goes for Egypt, which is
trying to broker peace between Israel and Hamas: as the political costs of reaching
an agreement beyond a temporary ceasefire momentarily exceed the expected bene-
fits, both factions remain irreconcilable in their fundamental stance to each other.
What becomes apparent when comparing the current initiatives is that regional actors
are extremely successful in bringing the conflicting parties together and to agree on
much-needed compromise, but very often they lack the capability to underwrite, secure,
or even enforce their agreements. This is where the need for external actors in general
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and the US in particular becomes apparent: in the end, any peace accord needs to be
accepted by the American administration – if it does not, it is not likely to last very long.
3. Options for European engagement
Against this background, the fact that regional actors are performing quite well in
their negotiation and mediation efforts does not mean that there is no role for Europe
to play in the Middle East. On the contrary, there is still plenty to do for external
actors. Traditionally it was always the US that played the most important part, but
given Washington’s poor reputation in the Middle East the importance of the EU has
increased.The EU should acknowledge this and endorse the regional approaches and
try to support them, making use of the resources and assets that distinguish it from
other actors in order to facilitate their implementation and to enhance their status
within the international community in general and vis-à-vis the US in particular.
The EU constitutes to be the most important donor to the peace process. However,
the EU should not be satisfied with being only the payer of the process, as Ariel
Sharon famously said, but should also aim at establishing itself as a key player. Europe
possesses the diplomatic resources and the political credibility to support the region-
al initiatives and help overcome stalemates in the negotiations. Europeans could use
their bilateral political relations with the actors, or act within the EU framework.
Additional opportunities to underscore Europe’s commitment and support regional
initiatives are high-profile events like the founding summit of the Union for the
Mediterranean in Paris on July 13, 2008. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and
Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas used the event to demonstrate their commit-
ment to the peace-process and went on record with the statement that they were as
close to an agreement as never before.53 Even more remarkable was the announce-
ment of Syria and Lebanon that the two countries would exchange ambassadors and
open respective embassies. Contrary to the statement of President Abbas and Prime
Minister Olmert, Syrian-Lebanese diplomatic relations have been established in the
meantime.54 Although the Union for the Mediterranean was initially a French project
and caused some irritation among the EU Member States, the EU should adopt and
make use of the concept, as it represents an important forum to enhance the foreign
policy impact of the EU and reorder Europe’s relations with the Mediterranean.55
Moreover, the Europeans should support initiatives that include groups like Hamas
or Hezbollah in the negotiation process. One might like it or not, against the will of
these groups it will be very difficult to achieve a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
as well as the Israeli-Arab conflict. Regional mediators have already taken this fact
into account. For the EU, however, it seems advisable to use contacts behind the 
scenes when approaching these groups – as was the case with France and Hamas
and with Germany and Hezbollah, respectively.
Yet, regional diplomacy sometimes will not suffice. Most of the negotiations will only
be finalized with the approval of the US, as it will be Washington who has the hard
security capabilities that are needed to ensure any peace-deal. This is especially
important in the case of Israel and Syria. Given that the EU is still a defence policy
actor in the making, its role on that matter will be limited. Even though the devel-
opment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) holds a high place on
the political agenda of the EU in general, it will take some time until the EU is real-
ly in a position to flex its military muscle. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that
European soldiers provide the largest share of the Unifil force in Southern Lebanon.
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Moreover, to provide for sustainable solutions, not only hard security is needed:
underdevelopment und weak institutions amplify many of the ongoing crises and
conflicts. Given its economic might and its know-how on issues like state-building,
the EU is an important partner when it comes to peace-building efforts, the estab-
lishment or reform of state institutions, humanitarian aid, and related issues.
Especially in the Palestinian territories the EU is playing an important role in this
regard. There is an ongoing ESDP mission in the West Bank to train Palestinian po-
lice officers. Moreover, until Hamas’coup in 2007 there was also an ESDP mission at
the border between the Gaza strip and Egypt, at Rafah. In addition to that, Germany
organized an international conference on how to strengthen international support
for the Palestinian institution-building efforts in June of 2008. The EU should contin-
ue and increase its efforts to support the process of institution building in Palestine.
4. Conclusion
Ultimately, regional actors have displayed a strong commitment to contribute to the
resolution of the conflicts in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has brokered a peace deal
between Hamas and Fatah, Turkey has arranged talks between Israel and Syria,
Egypt is working towards a rapprochement between Hamas and Israel. The Emir of
Qatar succeeded in ending the political stalemate in Lebanon, and Yemen has
brought the conflicting Palestinian parties together for the Sana’a-declaration.
These initiatives show that regional actors themselves have taken on the responsibili-
ty of stabilizing the region, and their current success boosts cautious hopes for peace.
While these actors lack the capabilities to engage in pure power mediation, they pos-
sess cultural and political know-how, and their intentions and thus the initiatives they
brought forward are held highly credible. These skills and soft powers are needed to
get engaged in the protracted conflicts of the Middle East, encourage negotiations,
conflict transformation, and ultimately conflict resolution. Hence, most of the media-
tion initiatives have a strong focus on the facilitation of communication between the
conflict parties, even though there are also efforts that include the exercise of direct
influence on the parties or the conflict itself (e.g. through economic incentives).
However, in some cases it is very likely that regional actors cannot go all the way
alone. Especially US consent is needed to underwrite any political deal and provide
for a sustainable solution. This does not mean that the EU can abdicate from its own
responsibility. Europe has the political strength as well as the resources to provide
valuable assistance to the reconciliation endeavors, not only as an actor in interna-
tional politics, but also as an important member of the Middle East Quartet. It should
thus build on its existing missions and engage in peacekeeping, institution building,
and, most importantly, diplomacy. Europe has the credibility as well as the strategic
ties in the region of which it should make use. Doing this, Europe should endorse a
more inclusive approach and talk to all the affected parties. This refers predominate-
ly to Hamas and Syria, as peace will not be possible without them.
In summation, new mediators have entered the political stage in the Middle East and
started to play a central role. These diplomatic initiatives offer plenty of possibilities
for European engagement: diplomatic, humanitarian, and civilian. Since the EU has
a serious interest in stabilizing the Middle East it should not sit on the fence and
watch how regional actors try to find a way out of the abyss, but should rather give
full support to the regional initiatives and pull its weight and work towards a lasting
peace.
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A
ppendix: M
ediators in the M
iddle East 
 
 
 
D
ate/ M
ediation 
effort 
C
ontent 
A
ssessm
ent 
R
esources and Strategies 
2008 
Indirect talks 
betw
een Israel 
and H
am
as 
 
 In June a six-m
onth ceasefire w
as agreed upon. 
  
 U
ntil early N
ovem
ber, the ceasefire had proven 
considerably stable, but new
 outbreaks of violence and 
increased tension betw
een both factions since then. The 
ceasefire w
ill expire in D
ecem
ber. 
 
2008 
Invitation to 
H
am
as and Fatah 
for peace talks 
 
 R
eturn to the status quo ante before the m
ass arrests 
in July 2008; re-conciliation of H
am
as and Fatah. 
 
 B
oth parties w
ant a national unity governm
ent but have 
incom
patible ideas concerning the im
plem
entation. 
The m
eeting of both parties in C
airo scheduled for 
N
ovem
ber has been cancelled by H
am
as. 
 
Egypt 
2008 
Involvem
ent in 
the preparations 
for the D
oha-
A
greem
ent 
 
 
 Q
atar 
 
 Egypt historically is a key player 
in A
rab politics, but also one of 
the few
 trusted A
rab partners in 
Israel. 
 R
eferent and legitim
ate pow
er. 
 Focus on com
m
unication-
facilitating and form
ulation 
strategies. 
 
2002 
A
rab Peace 
Initiative 
  
 “Land for peace”: 
R
ecognition of Israel and norm
alization of relations 
w
ith all A
rab States, if Israel in turn agrees to pull 
out of the occupied territories from
 1967 and grants 
Palestinian refugees a right to return.  
Proposes the creation of a Palestinian state w
ith 
East Jerusalem
 as the capital. 
 
 C
ould not be im
plem
ented but still rem
ains an im
portant 
and m
utually accepted fram
ew
ork for a possible 
accom
m
odation. 
 
2007 
M
ecca, m
ediation 
betw
een H
am
as 
and Fatah 
 
 C
reation of a N
ational U
nity G
overnm
ent. 
 
 V
ery short-lived, fighting started a few
 m
onths later and 
the joint governm
ent collapsed. 
  
Saudi Arabia 
2007 
Invitation of 
A
hm
adinejad to 
the pilgrim
age to 
M
ecca 
 
 A
ttem
pt to settle the conflict in Lebanon and 
im
prove political clim
ate in the G
ulf region. 
 
 C
ould not prevent escalation in Lebanon and strengthening 
of H
ezbollah, but im
portant political gesture vis-à-vis Iran.  
 Strong influence on the A
rab 
League, vast oil reserves, and the 
confidence of the U
nited States. 
 A
s hom
e of the Tw
o H
oly 
M
osques, M
ecca and M
edina, 
exceptional position in M
uslim
 
w
orld. 
 R
ew
ard and coercive pow
er, as 
w
ell as legitim
ate and referent 
pow
er. 
 C
om
m
unication-facilitation and 
form
ulation strategies, but also 
arbitration. 
 
2008 
M
ecca, m
ediation 
betw
een Taliban 
leaders and 
A
fghan 
governm
ent  
 
 A
ttem
pt to stabilize the political situation in 
A
fghanistan. 
 Sym
bolic event, the practical outcom
es have yet to be seen. 
 
2008 
H
osting of 
indirect peace 
talks betw
een 
Syria and Israel 
     
 Shuttle-diplom
acy, but direct talks seem
 possible 
H
ighest priority is the status of the G
olan H
eights 
and the final line of the border. 
   
 Israel has postponed the fifth round of negotiations, but 
declares its w
illingness for a dialogue.  
 B
oth sides do not trust each other. 
 U
ncertainty about w
ho w
ill succeed O
lm
ert. 
 A
ssad is said to have handed in a proposal for peace w
ith 
Israel. 
Turkey 
2008 
Support of the 
D
oha A
greem
ent 
 
 
 Q
atar 
 
 G
ood relations to Syria and Iran, 
Turkey functions as a link 
betw
een the east and the w
est. 
 N
on-perm
anent m
em
ber of U
N
-
Security C
ouncil (2009-2010). 
 R
eferent, legitim
ate, political and 
m
ilitary pow
er.  
 Focus on com
m
unication-
facilitation. 
Yemen 
2008 
Sana’a 
D
eclaration 
 Joint declaration of H
am
as and Fatah, brokered by 
Y
em
en to end the conflict that recrudesced after the 
breakdow
n of the national unity governm
ent. 
 B
oth parties give little im
portance to the declaration, 
H
am
as and Fatah seem
 non-conciliatory. 
 N
eutrality, “legitim
ate pow
er of 
the pow
erless”, expert pow
er. 
 
Qatar 
2008 
D
oha A
greem
ent  
 
 Form
ation of a national unity governm
ent in 
Lebanon, reshaping of the distribution of pow
er. 
 
 D
oha is an interim
 agreem
ent, legislative elections are to be 
held in 2009. 
 M
ichel Suleim
an is elected president after six m
onths of 
political stalem
ate. 
 H
ezbollah is strengthened, but the m
ovem
ent’s 
participation in the new
 governm
ent is still disputed, 
H
ezbollah has not disarm
ed yet.  
 
 G
ood relations w
ith both the U
S 
and Israel and Iran, huge 
financial resources to back 
m
ediation efforts. 
 Legitim
ate pow
er 
 Focus on consultation and 
form
ulation strategies. 
 
USA 
2007 
A
nnapolis 
 
 A
ttem
pt to reach an all-em
bracing resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the end of 2008, 
including a tw
o-state-solution. 
Political, hum
anitarian and financial support by the 
EU
. 
  
 N
o clear agenda, no consideration of regional issues, no 
considerable progress. 
 N
ovem
ber 2008: official declaration that a final resolution 
w
ill not be reached by 2008, instead establishm
ent of the 
“groundw
ork” for further negotiations. 
 
 Strong interest in stability in the 
region. 
 Financial, diplom
atic and 
m
ilitary capacity to secure an 
agreem
ent.  
 Focus on pow
er m
ediation, 
arbitration and form
ulation 
strategies. 
 
2003 
R
oadm
ap 
 
 
 M
iddle East Q
uartet 
 
2007 
A
ction Plan for 
the M
iddle East 
 
 Institution building, education, security, 
strengthening the private sector. 
 
 N
o concrete action taken. 
 
2008 
Founding of a 
U
nion for the 
M
editerranean 
 
 N
ew
 political fram
ew
ork for Euro-M
editerranean 
Partnership (EM
P). 
 
 A
n am
bitious fram
ew
ork that w
ould provide a useful 
platform
 for engagem
ent in the M
iddle East in the future 
but is not yet fully developed. 
European Union 
2008 
Founding sum
m
it 
of the U
nion for 
the M
editerranean 
 
 O
rganization of m
eetings betw
een  
A
ssad and Suleim
an – engagem
ent of Syria, 
establishm
ent of diplom
atic relations betw
een Syria 
and Lebanon announced. 
 
A
bbas and O
lm
ert – support for A
nnapolis process, 
negotiations about Palestinian prisoners. 
 D
iplom
atic relations have been established. H
ow
ever, a 
norm
alization of the Syrian-Lebanese relations has yet to 
be achieved. 
  B
oth parties have displayed their good w
ill, but w
ere 
unable to m
ake substantial progress in the peace process.  
 O
n both sides uncertainty about the future leadership; 
Palestinian side divided in H
am
as and Fatah. 
 
N
o strong m
ilitary, but a civilian 
pow
er, good relations to the 
countries involved. 
 A
n accepted partner for state-
building and hum
anitarian 
affairs.  
 H
igh credibility in peace-
building efforts. 
 The m
ain sponsor of the peace 
process.  
 M
em
ber States can provide 
m
ilitary resources. 
 Som
e M
em
ber States possess 
historical ties to the region (e.g. 
France and U
nited K
ingdom
).  
 Focus on com
m
unication-
facilitating and form
ulation 
strategies, but also on arbitration. 
 
Middle East  
Quartet 
2003  
R
oadm
ap 
 
 Plan for a gradual peace agreem
ent, endorsing a 
tw
o-state-solution based on m
utual recognition and 
an accord on the final status of Jerusalem
. 
Inclusion of Egypt, Saudi A
rabia, and Jordan. 
 
 C
ould not be realized, but rem
ains the m
ost im
portant 
fram
ew
ork for a perm
anent, all-em
bracing agreem
ent. 
D
ivision of Palestinians com
plicates a tw
o-state-solution. 
 
 H
igh potential of rew
ard and 
coercive pow
er, expert pow
er. 
 Form
ulation strategies and pow
er 
m
ediation. 
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